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Abstract
Satellite broadband services are critical infrastructures en-
abling advanced technologies to function in the most remote
regions of the globe. However, status-quo services are often
unencrypted by default and vulnerable to eavesdropping at-
tacks. In this paper, we challenge the historical perception that
over-the-air security must trade off with TCP performance in
high-latency satellite networks due to the deep-packet inspec-
tion requirements of Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs).
After considering why prior work in this area has failed
to find wide adoption, we present an open-source encrypted-
by-default PEP - QPEP - which seeks to address these issues.
QPEP is built around the open QUIC standard and designed
so individual customers may adopt it without ISP involve-
ment. QPEP’s performance is assessed through simulations in
a replicable docker-based testbed. Across many benchmarks
and network conditions, QPEP is found to avoid the perceived
security-encryption trade-off in PEP design. Compared to un-
encrypted PEP implementations, QPEP reduces average page
load times by more than 30% while also offering over-the-air
privacy. Compared to the traditional VPN encryption avail-
able to customers today, QPEP more than halves average page
load times. Together, these experiments lead to the conclusion
that QPEP represents a promising new approach to protecting
modern satellite broadband connections.
1 Introduction
Historically, security and performance have often traded-off
in satellite broadband service design. As a result, many satel-
lite internet service providers (ISPs) do not offer over-the-
air encryption in their satellite networks, exposing sensitive
customer data to eavesdropping and manipulation. The phys-
ical characteristics of satellite networks have given rise to
this trade off as techniques to optimize TCP connections
over high-latency satellite links require deep-packet inspec-
tion which is incompatible with end-to-end encryption. This
causes VPNs and traditional encrypted tunnels to perform
poorly over satellite networks.
Since the early 2000s, academics and satellite communica-
tions business have struggled with the challenge of encrypt-
ing these TCP communications while maintaining acceptable
performance. In Section 2 we delve into this challenge and
several notable approaches to better understand why proposed
solutions have seen limited adoption in real-world networks.
We find that, even when encrypted satellite broadband prod-
ucts are available, they are generally geared towards large
business clients and inaccessible to individual home users
of satellite broadband. Moreover, available offerings are of-
ten costly and unverifiable due to their proprietary nature,
disincentivizing adoption.
We find that existing academic proposals, while numerous,
are often purely theoretical or lack replicable source-code.
To our knowledge, no open-source encryption tool exists for
performant TCP communications over satellite links. Even
if it did, the lack of standardized testing and simulation envi-
ronments for PEP products make it difficult to compare and
benchmark techniques without direct access to a satellite ISP
and their ground stations. Additionally, the limited number of
open-source unencrypted PEPs available mean that potential
researchers seeking to make a practical security contribution
must either repurpose outdated code (generally written in
C/C++) to implement modern encryption protocols or must
re-invent PEP proxies from scratch, requiring deep knowledge
not just of security but also low-level network programming.
The end result is that satellite broadband users have no
good options. They (or their ISPs) must purchase expensive
and unvetted proprietary applications, accept the substantial
performance hit caused by general-purpose VPNs, or trans-
mit sensitive data in clear text over massive satellite signal
footprints.
This paper seeks to address both the lack of encryption op-
tions and the high barriers to research in this domain. Its pri-
mary contribution is QPEP - an open-source PEP which offers
privacy by default. Built around the open and modern QUIC
transportation protocol, QPEP benefits from research inno-
vations in a much larger community than the niche satellite
security field. The tool itself is implemented entirely in Go, an
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Figure 1: Notional Overview of a GEO Network
accessible and modern language, to encourage research con-
tributions from developers who may be uncomfortable imple-
menting encryption and networking protocols in C/C++. As a
secondary contribution, the paper presents an open-source and
extensible docker-based simulation testbed, built on the Open-
SAND satellite networking simulation engine [11, 39]. The
testbed is provided to facilitate easy replication of our own
performance benchmarks and assess the performance of other
PEP appliances. It enables meaningful comparisons between
PEP approaches and aims to decrease the friction involved in
future contributions which improve on our methods.
Within this testbed, we find that QPEP performs well
across several benchmarking tests. It more than halves av-
erage page load times compared to the use of VPN encryption
and matches or exceeds the performance of unencrypted PEP
applications. Additional simulations are conducted under ad-
verse network conditions and orbital configurations and we
assess the viability of some simple modifications to the stan-
dard QUIC protocol for satellite network usage. Ultimately,
we find that QPEP represents a promising solution for over-
the-air encryption in satellite networks which can be deployed
by individual satellite customers without sacrificing network
performance or security.
2 Background and Related Work
To understand the security and performance trade-off in satel-
lite broadband services requires a basic understanding of the
design of satellite networks and the behavior of the TCP
protocol in this environment. In this section, we provide a
high-level overview of the key factors behind this dynamic
and prior work in academia and industry to address them.
2.1 Satellite Networks and Eavesdropping
Our principal focus is on satellite broadband provided from
platforms in geostationary earth orbit (GEO). The basic op-
eration of GEO broadband can be thought of as a “bent pipe”
(see Figure 1). First, the broadband customer points their
satellite at a fixed position in the sky and transmits IP packets
towards a receiving satellite transponder. These IP packets are
encapsulated using a protocol like Return Link Encapsulation
(RLE) over Digital Video Broadcasting - Return Channel Via
Satellite (DVB-RCS) or S-band Mobile Interactive Multime-
dia (S-MIM) (step 1 in Figure 1). The satellite then relays this
encapsulated stream towards a ground station on Earth (step
2). At the ground station, the satellite ISP will decapsulate the
stream into IP packets and route them across the internet via
terrestrial networks (step 3). When a response directed to the
satellite customer is received by the ISP (step A in Figure 1),
this process occurs again in reverse. The ISP encapsulates
the stream using one of a number of forward-link standards
(e.g. Generic Stream Encapsulation (GSE) over Digital Video
Broadcasting - Satellite (DVB-S)) and transmits the stream
up towards the satellite (step B). The satellite relays this
stream down to the customer whose modem decapsulates it
and routes it along their home or business network (step C).
As GEO is located more than 30,000 km away from the
Earth’s surface, a single satellite has line of sight to a vast
area on the surface (theoretically as much as 40% of the
Earth’s surface, but practically closer to 20% for broadband
communications). This has the advantage of making GEO
broadband a relatively inexpensive mechanism of providing
global service. Only a half-dozen satellites are needed for
almost complete Earth coverage (barring some polar areas).
This vast footprint also creates intuitive appeal for eaves-
dropping attacks as wide-reaching signals are not targeted
towards specific user terminals. As a result, an attacker mon-
itoring GEO broadcasts can passively eavesdrop on traffic
belonging to an entire continent of satellite customers. Real
world experiments have shown that it is possible to use inex-
pensive equipment to intercept deeply sensitive data from
these feeds - ranging from login credentials for offshore
wind farms to passport information belonging to cargo ship
crews [14, 21, 29, 30].
In light of such security concerns, it is not intuitively clear
why status quo satellite broadband services fail to encrypt cus-
tomer traffic over the air. At its core, the barrier to encryption
is a physical one. Speed of light delays over the 30,000 km
hop to GEO are substantial and round-trip packet latency can
exceed 600 ms in an otherwise perfectly optimized network.
While many of these challenges could theoretically be mit-
igated by using satellites closer to Earth in low Earth orbit
(LEO), this increases the complexity of global coverage. LEO
satellites benefit from only 50 ms in speed-of-light latency
but only maintain line of sight to a point on Earth’s surface
for a matter of minutes. To provide consistent global coverage
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with 50 ms latency would require hundreds or even thousands
of satellites. In the status quo, even LEO constellations can
experience round-trip packet delays of up to 1,500 ms de-
pending on the specific route a message takes through the
constellation to a ground station [24]. Thus, while many new
LEO constellations are in the early stages of development,
and have made ambitious claims regarding expected latency,
GEO broadband and high-latency will both likely remain rel-
evant characteristics for both modern and upcoming satellite
networks [27, 34].
2.2 TCP Performance Over Satellite
To understand how this high latency prevents robust encryp-
tion in satellite networks, one must consider the impact of
latency on TCP performance. Without any optimizations, TCP
connections over satellite links would appear sluggish and
unusable for most customers - even with high bandwidth allo-
cation and top-quality equipment due to these physical effects.
In this subsection, we will touch on two of the main contribu-
tors to this performance degradation. However, these barriers
and many others have also been much more extensively char-
acterized in prior work [4, 6, 28].
2.2.1 Barriers to TCP in Satellite Networks
The first challenge to TCP performance in satellite networks
arises from the requirement that TCP data packets are re-
sponded to with an acknowledgment (ACK) message. These
ACK exchanges cause additional blocking round-trip trans-
missions over the high-latency satellite link. The effect is
compounded by the three-way handshake used for session ini-
tialization which, in the best case, takes upwards of 1,500 ms
to complete over GEO. When visiting a website with em-
bedded images and related files, many three-way handshakes
be required to download the relevant content - compounding
delays. Although modern TCP implementations may employ
ACK decimation to reduce the total number of ACKs, these
are not configured to appropriate ratios for satellite networks.
Indeed, in many older and embedded devices, ACKs are still
elicited by every TCP packet, massively increasing the per-
ceived latency of the satellite link.
The second challenge arises from the nature of TCP conges-
tion control and the TCP “slow-start” session initialization. In
order to implement effective ACK decimation, TCP slow-start
gradually increases the ratio of data segments to ACKs until a
desired congestion window is reached. The time this process
takes to finish is thus a function of round-trip times (RTT)
over the satellite link. Even once a connection has reached
optimal window size, packet loss will be misidentified as a
sign of network congestion and cause the slow-start sequence
to restart from the beginning. While modern satellite trans-
missions are more reliable than in the past, packet loss is still
common compared to terrestrial networks. As a result, TCP
sessions are both slow to maximize their bandwidth usage,
and, once maximized, struggle to maintain that state.
These are two factors among many impacting TCP perfor-
mance over satellite links. Beyond latency effects, particulari-
ties in satellite network topology combine to create a uniquely
hostile environment for standard TCP implementations. As a
result, satellite service providers have had to build and deploy
modifications to the TCP traffic on their networks. It is these
modifications that act as substantial barriers to the effective
deployment of over-the-air encryption services.
2.2.2 PEPs
The most common approach to optimizing TCP traffic over
satellite environments is the use of a class of appliances called
“Performance Enhancing Proxies” or PEPs and loosely de-
scribed in IETF RFC 3135. While PEPs can differ substan-
tially and many implementations are proprietary, most PEPs
adhere to a few basic principles.
There are two typical PEP deployment options - integrated
or distributed. In integrated PEPs, a PEP appliance operates on
a single endpoint - typically the ISP satellite gateway between
the satellite network and the internet. In distributed PEPs, a
PEP appliance operates on multiple endpoints - typically both
on the customer satellite modem and the ISP gateway.
In either deployment, the PEP observes TCP traffic which
passes through it and applies optimizations in order to com-
pensate for satellite performance issues. Typically, PEPs do
this in a manner which is invisible to the endpoints of the con-
versations so that no modifications are required on consumer
hardware and the ISP can use commercial internet routing
technology. This is referred to as a “transparent” PEP. How-
ever, the concept of transparency here is somewhat misleading
as, in many cases, PEP modifications are still detectable (e.g.
changing TCP sequence numbers).
Beyond this, PEPs vary quite broadly. The modifications
made to optimize TCP traffic are often proprietary and
implementation-specific. One common approach is to “split”
incoming TCP connections prior to transmission across the
satellite link and issue local ACK messages immediately for
received TCP packets. This allows three-way handshakes and
congestion control to be negotiated locally before the satellite
hop but requires the PEP developer to implement logic ensur-
ing that packet loss and connection errors on one side of the
split are correctly handled on the other.
In distributed PEPs, this splitting approach is extended to
create a tunnel between the individual PEP installations (see
Figure 2). A TCP packet arriving at the client-side PEP (e.g.
on the home satellite modem), is terminated locally as a TCP
connection, and the payload is then forwarded through GEO
using a modified TCP protocol (e.g. with larger congestion
windows) or an alternative non-TCP protocol optimized for
satellite networks. At the ISP gateway, a second PEP receives
this modified TCP packet, converts it back to normal traffic,
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Figure 2: Split Distributed PEP Handshake Example
and sends it along a locally-managed TCP connection to the
internet. This allows for ACK messages to be handled local
to either end of the satellite hop and reduces the number of
round-trips needed to initialize a TCP session.
Other PEP optimizations can range from modifying TCP
congestion control to bundling related packets into sin-
gle transmissions. Commercial implementations often offer
higher-level features such as inspecting HTTP payloads and
combining requests for web-pages with their associated con-
tent. A substantial body of existing work on PEPs covers these
optimizations in detail not only for satellites, but also other la-
tency sensitive environments (e.g. cellular networks) [4,6,28].
2.2.3 Security Consequences
PEPs have become a vital component of satellite broadband
and customers have come to expect the performance charac-
teristics of PEP-accelerated networks. This has created unin-
tended tension between broadband performance and security.
As noted in RFC 3135, PEPs break the end-to-end seman-
tics of IP connections. Specifically, they require that the PEP
appliance transparently modify packets “over-the-wire” - es-
sentially acting as a benevolent man-in-the-middle on all TCP
connections. This makes it impossible for PEPs to function on
network layer encryption tunnels, such as IPSec VPNs, which
encrypt the TCP header information necessary to split ses-
sions and optimize packets. While VPNs still work over PEPs,
performance for users is as if no PEP was deployed, creating
functionally unusable services. As a result, end consumers
are faced with a choice between the security and privacy of
VPNs and the convenience and performance of PEPs.
In short, latency necessitates the use of PEPs and PEPs
prevent the use of typical end-to-end encryption. The result
is that many modern satellite networks still transmit deeply
sensitive information over-the-air in clear text. These issues
are, of course, fairly well known and many academic and
industry techniques have been presented to mitigate them.
2.3 Existing Security Approaches
In this section, we will briefly consider some of the more
consequential approaches to satellite broadband encryption at
each layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack. This analysis better
characterizes how, despite a long history of research, PEP-
compatible security remains unsolved in practice.
2.3.1 Physical and Link-Layer Approaches
Many techniques for over-the-air encryption focus on the
lower layers of the networking stack - before TCP/IP be-
comes relevant. For example, physical-layer techniques such
as frequency hopping with channel patterns derived from cryp-
tographic keys or direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS)
have been suggested as a mechanism for securing the entire
satellite link from eavesdropping attacks [22]. Likewise the
injection of artificial noise into satellite signals as an alter-
native to key-based encryption has also been proposed [40].
These schemes tend to prioritize military communications
systems. This makes sense as they often require expensive
changes to groundstation and terminal hardware that would
be unpalatable for commercial adopters.
At the link layer, proposals can still incur hardware costs
but these costs are often restricted to hardware chips used for
protocol decapsulation. For example, the Consultative Com-
mittee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) has proposed Space
Data Link Security (SDLS), a communications protocol with
built-in encryption for telemetry commands to scientific space
missions [7]. Likewise, in the satellite television broadcast-
ing space, the proprietary Common Scrambling Algorithm
(CSA) has long been used to restrict broadcast access to pay-
ing satellite television subscribers using smart-cards, albeit
with notable security weaknesses [23].
One security issue for link and physical layer encryption
that is unique to broadband relates to the multi-user envi-
ronment. It is rarely economically feasible to allocate each
satellite terminal a unique channel or transponder. In prac-
tice, modems determine which packets in a given stream are
relevant to their owners on the basis of packet header infor-
mation (e.g. IP addresses). In such systems, customers who
share a forward-link frequency must necessarily also share
physical/link-layer keys needed to receive that frequency.
2.3.2 Network and Transport-Layer Approaches
In order to provide over-the-air encryption with scalable per-
customer keys, a number of network layer techniques have
been proposed. In contrast with lower level approaches, in-
teractions with TCP PEPs must now be considered directly.
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Many seek to replicate traditional VPN software with be-
spoke modifications - for example by creating a modified
IPSec with special encapsulating headers visible to PEP ap-
pliances [10, 13]. Proprietary satellite VPNs also exist which,
while public information on their design is limited, are likely
similar in principle [12, 15]. Beyond concerns arising from
the use of proprietary encryption schemes, these non-standard
encapsulation layers can increase operator costs by limiting
compatibility with the ISP’s existing networking equipment.
As one of the principal challenges for satellite broadband
encryption is PEP-compatibility, it makes intuitive sense to
incorporate encryption within PEP appliances themselves
- straddling the network and transport layers. This may be
achieved by, for example, implementing an encrypted proto-
col over the satellite hop in a distributed PEP system. The
transmitting PEP would first modify the TCP packets, then
encrypt them. The receiving PEP would subsequently decrypt
the received packets and forward them along the internet as
normal. Many real-world PEP encryption products appear to
employ this approach [18, 26, 31].
To the best of our knowledge, most, if not all, imple-
mentations of encrypted PEPs are proprietary and security
claims are thus difficult to independently verify. However, pur-
ported leaked manufacturer documents allude to built-in law-
enforcement/intelligence back-doors in prominent encrypted
PEP products [36]. Our own superficial analysis of one satel-
lite router found numerous cryptographic shortcomings, such
as Diffie-Hellman implementations which are susceptible to
man-in-the-middle attacks and key/IV reuse that permits re-
play attacks. Similar vulnerabilities have been alluded to in
prior research conducted in the mid-2000s [1]. Generally, the
costs of adopting an encrypted PEP must be undertaken by
the satellite ISP. ISPs may not perceive these purchases as
value-for-money absent customer or regulatory pressure.
2.3.3 Application-Layer Approaches
An alternative approach would be the use of encryption proto-
cols which operate over the PEP-accelerated TCP connection
(i.e. encrypting payloads but leaving TCP headers exposed).
The widespread use of TLS encryption for websites, for ex-
ample, has the effect of encrypting customer data which is
transmitted over-the-air on satellite links. However, this still
leaks potentially sensitive data (such as the IPs a customer
visits). Moreover, real-world observations of modern satellite
traffic (see 2.1) have found that, while customers could use
TLS and other encrypted protocols, many still use insecure
alternatives such as POP3 or HTTP.
While the decision to use insecure protocols is the cus-
tomer’s, satellite ISPs may nevertheless have a duty of care to
protect this data over-the-air. One option would be to tunnel
these insecure protocols into an application-layer encrypted
stream before the data egresses from the client. This method
is employed in some commercial satellite encryption prod-
ucts but has the notable disadvantage of requiring a software
application to be installed on the client’s computer [17]. This
limits compatibility with many embedded devices and creates
friction in the customer experience.
3 QPEP Design and Implementation
To address some of these shortcomings in prior work and
provide an open-source and non-proprietary tool for satel-
lite encryption which can be used by individual satellite cus-
tomers, we have developed QPEP. At its core, QPEP follows
a distributed “snooping” PEP model similar to the methods
described in Section 2.3.2. The QPEP client tunnels TCP
traffic over the satellite link inside a stream that leverages
the encrypted QUIC transport protocol. Tunneled traffic is
decapsulated by a receiving QPEP server which then routes
the decapsulated traffic over the internet as if it were the client.
A high level overview of this architecture appears in Figure 3.
This section covers further details of the QPEP system and
design decisions made in our proof-of-concept implementa-
tion.
3.1 Use of the QUIC Protocol
The principal difference between QPEP and existing propri-
etary implementations is the use of the QUIC protocol for
tunneling traffic over the satellite link. While the QUIC pro-
tocol is still in the early stages of development and standards
are evolving, it has seen real-world adoption in terrestrial net-
works due to its performance and security advantages over
TCP. Several of these benefits make QUIC a promising option
for deployment in the secure PEP context.
3.1.1 QUIC Security Benefits
QUIC is an encrypted-by-default protocol. Unlike TCP, the
session initialization process for QUIC also incorporates a
modified version of the TLS 1.3 handshake (see Figure 4).
This means that every QUIC session provides both encryption
for encapsulated payloads and built-in end-point authentica-
tion. The former mitigates against the security and privacy
concerns raised by status-quo satellite broadband while the
latter prevents the aforementioned man-in-the-middle issues
in some proprietary encrypted PEPs.
A key factor distinguishing the use of a QUIC tunnel from
commercial tunneling-based PEPs (e.g. Tellitec’s ETCP prod-
uct) is that QUIC, while theoretically a transport-layer proto-
col, is implemented in practice as an application layer protocol
on top of IP and UDP [26]. As a result, the use of QPEP does
not require the satellite ISP to install a PEP server on their
own gateway to decapsulate encrypted traffic. Instead, a satel-
lite customer can use QUIC to tunnel their traffic through the
ISP gateway and onwards to a QPEP server running on any
internet-routable endpoint.
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This means that individual satellite customers can employ
QPEP without participation from their ISP. In this way, QPEP
might best be compared to prior work on satellite VPN pro-
tocols [10, 13]. However, unlike these proposals, which of-
ten reveal limited portions of the TCP header to ISP PEPs
(e.g. destination IP, port numbers, and TCP flags), only the
IP address and UDP port of the customer’s upstream QPEP
server are visible. All information regarding the actual TCP
connection is encapsulated within the QUIC tunnel. This al-
lows customers to benefit from both satellite encryption and
PEP acceleration without requiring any special trust in their
ISP. In most satellite networks, QPEP should function even
in the presence of other ISP-installed PEP appliances. Of
course, customers may not be interested in configuring QPEP
themselves. In such cases QPEP can also be installed by the
satellite ISP onto the customer modem and their own gateway
just as with traditional PEP appliances.
3.1.2 QUIC Performance Benefits
Beyond these security benefits - which would largely apply
to any encrypted UDP tunnel - the use of QUIC offers several
notable performance advantages.
First, the initial QUIC connection can be negotiated in a
single round-trip, substantially shorter than the TCP three-
way handshake. When compared with alternative encrypted
tunnel schemes - such as TLS-based VPNs - QUIC offers a
substantial reduction in round-trip transfers (see Figure 4).
Indeed, for previously known QUIC servers, it is possible for
a client to begin transmitting data from the very first packet,
enabling zero round-trip session initialization.
Additionally, unlike TCP, QUIC does not require that all
packets in a stream be processed in a particular order - re-
moving head-of-line blocking issues involved when losing
packets in a TCP stream and permitting heavy multiplexing.
This makes it possible for QPEP to encapsulate multiple TCP
flows inside a single QUIC session. This further reduces the
number of session-initialization round-trips required to handle
concurrent TCP streams.
Like TCP, QUIC has built-in support for the re-transmission
of lost and corrupted packets. This obviates many of the his-
torical barriers to using UDP-tunnels over the satellite link
as QUIC provides guaranteed packet transmission. Moreover,
some draft proposals suggest the addition of built in forward
error correction (FEC). These proposals have largely stalled
as initial experiments found only minimal performance dif-
ferences in terrestrial networks from FEC [35]. However, as
the standard evolves and future work is done on QUIC FEC,
QPEP may be able to take advantage of this feature for further
reliability gains in the lossy satellite environment.
3.1.3 Satellite Performance
As QUIC is a relatively recent protocol, its use in satellite
environments has not been subject to much research. What
little does exist is largely inconclusive. Some preliminary
real-world assessments have found significant issues with
QUIC performance in satellite environments resulting in an
up to 100% increase in page load times compared to PEP-
accelerated TCP connections [37]. However, other assess-
ments suggest that QUIC performs far better than TCP, mea-
suring up to a 50% decrease page load times [32]. Preliminary
IETF and industry discussions have lead to a number of pro-
posed (but unimplemented) techniques for optimizing QUIC
connections to perform over satellite links [19].
This research on QUIC performance in satellite environ-
ments has focused on real-world end-to-end QUIC connec-
tions used to access HTTP2 web-servers which support the
QUIC protocol. In these cases, researchers only control the
client-side QUIC configuration settings. However, as QPEP
operates in a distributed model, it may be possible to modify
QUIC configuration settings or even implementation details
to optimize both server and client parameters for the satellite
link. Much as many modern PEP products modify TCP con-
gestion windows on the satellite link, QPEP may tailor QUIC
parameters relating to FEC, ACK decimation and congestion
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control to optimize for the satellite environment.
3.2 QPEP Implementation
Beyond the QUIC tunnel, QPEP operates in a manner similar
to a standard unencrypted distributed PEP. A typical QPEP
installation consists of two applications: the QPEP client
which is located on the customer side of the satellite link
and the QPEP server which is located on the internet side
of the satellite link - either at the satellite gateway (as in the
traditional PEP model) or elsewhere on the web.
The QPEP client may be installed anywhere on the net-
work path prior to the satellite hop. Typically, this would
likely be at the customer’s local router. At startup, the QPEP
client negotiates a long-standing QUIC session with the QPEP
server - typically requiring one round-trip for key negotiation.
After this, the QPEP client intercepts and terminates all in-
coming TCP connections, “spoofing” the destination TCP
server and completing both the three-way handshake and all
ACK messaging operations locally. A new QUIC stream is
opened and mapped to each TCP session. As these streams are
multiplexed within the overall QUIC session, no additional
handshake is required over the satellite link.
Within the QUIC stream, TCP payloads and relevant header
information are encapsulated into QUIC packets and trans-
mitted across the satellite hop. For simplicity, only IP address
and port fields are maintained, but there are no technical bar-
riers preventing the transmission of other TCP header data
(e.g. checksums or control flags). A socket listener on the
QPEP server parses this header information and payload as
it arrives. If no existing TCP session managed by the QPEP
server matches the TCP four-tuple extracted from the packet
header (i.e. Source Port, Source IP, Destination Port, and Des-
tination IP), the QPEP server initiates a new TCP session
based on this information. Otherwise, the TCP payload is
routed to the appropriate existing TCP session.
When a response is received from the internet, this same
process occurs in reverse. The QPEP server transmits an ACK
immediately and then encapsulates relevant TCP headers and
payload data into the active QUIC stream associated with the
TCP conversation. If no existing TCP session matches the
extracted headers (e.g. this is an attempt to initialize a session
from the internet to the satellite client), a new QUIC stream
is opened with the QPEP client and the three-way handshake
is completed immediately on the internet-side of the satellite
link. The QPEP client then decapsulates received packets,
converts them back into TCP packets and routes them across
the satellite customer’s local network.
QPEP is designed as a transparent PEP - requiring no spe-
cial software or configuration from connected hosts. This dif-
ferentiates it from application-layer commercial PEPs which
have limited compatibility with IOT and embedded systems.
While this proof-of-concept implementation of QPEP focuses
only on TCP connections targeted by traditional PEPs, only
minor modifications would be required to add support for
other protocols. This may be desirable for customers seeking
to encrypt UDP or ICMP messages over the satellite link.
An open-source reference implementation of the QPEP
approach is available in conjunction with this paper. This im-
plementation is written using Go. Go was selected to increase
accessibility without substantial performance sacrifices and
to facilitate future work on these problems. To the best of
our knowledge, only two non-proprietary PEP implementa-
tions exist, both of which are implemented in C/C++, have
no support for encrypted communications, and have received
only minimal development attention over the past several
years [9, 20]. Source artifacts for other academic PEPs are
either not publicly available or are restricted to particular
simulation environments (e.g. NS-2) [13, 38].
The QUIC implementation used by QPEP is based on the
widely used quic-go library which roughly tracks the IETF
proposal for QUIC standards [8]. As discussed in Section 5.3,
minor optional modifications to the QUIC implementation
are made to optimize performance in the satellite network-
ing environment. Future work considering the suitability of
other QUIC implementations - such as Google’s Chromium
implementation - may prove valuable [16].
4 Secure PEP Testbed
One of the principal challenges in developing and evaluating
PEP appliances has been the difficulty in creating realistic
simulations of satellite networking systems. The OpenSAND
engine, previously Platine, is a long-standing satellite net-
work simulation environment for replicating satellite data
operations [39]. OpenSAND supports modeling of both static
latency scenarios that would be expected in GEO broadcast-
ing as well as variable latency typical of LEO constellations.
Moreover, while many prior simulations of TCP performance
in high-delay networks simply rely on the addition of artifi-
cial delay to terrestrial networks, OpenSAND facilitates more
realistic metrics. For example, the engine supports built in at-
tenuation modeling and SNR emulation - facilitating realistic
packet-loss conditions which have significant impacts on TCP
congestion control performance. OpenSAND emulates the
satellite network down to the link layer, simulating low-level
protocol mitigations to noise and packet loss and creating
more real-world conditions.
OpenSAND, while a powerful simulation tool, is somewhat
difficult to configure - requiring multiple devices and precise
network conditions to deploy in its standard setup - a barrier
which has been noted in prior work [3]. In the process of
developing our own simulations, we have created a docker-
ized deployment of the OpenSAND engine geared towards
consistent and replicable evaluation of secure PEP implemen-
tations. This hopefully simplifies the process for researchers
interested in making future related contributions.
The testbed deployment creates a simple satellite network
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Figure 4: Simplified Comparison of QUIC and VPN Initialization
with a single gateway and satellite user terminal (as in Fig-
ure 1 and Figure 3). The gateway is connected by default
to the broader internet which allows a user connected to the
satellite terminal to open a web-browser and visit real-world
web services over the simulated satellite link. A gateway
workstation is also provided to facilitate reliable performance
metrics on the emulated host network with common bench-
marking tools pre-installed. Additionally, packet-capture tools
on the satellite node enable real-time monitoring of over-the
air transmissions, allowing for verification that sensitive data
is not transmitted in clear-text. Pre-configured installations
of QPEP, OpenVPN, and PEPsal are provided on both the
gateway and satellite terminal networks. A set of example
python scripts are provided to launch various benchmarking
tools and orchestrate the simulation scenarios used in our
own performance evaluations. These scripts are designed as
modular components to facilitate the direct and consistent
comparison of QPEP with proposals made in future work.
5 Q-PEP Simulated Evaluation
In this section, we present an evaluation of the QPEP ap-
proach to providing secure over-the-air satellite broadband
transmissions and its impact on the performance of TCP-
based traffic. To the best of our knowledge, no comparable
encrypted satellite PEP is publicly available for evaluation.
As such, we selected PEPsal, an open-source unencrypted
PEP solution, and OpenVPN, an open-source VPN product
without specific satellite networking optimizations, to provide
some context to measurements made. First, we present simple
experimental results under the default OpenSAND network
conditions. Next, we consider how QPEP fares under varying
satellite network conditions - namely high rates of packet loss
and in LEO networks with variable delay. Finally, we evalu-
ate the performance impacts of various modifications to the
QUIC protocol used in the PEP tunnel. All simulations are ex-
ecuted on the same laptop (Intel Core i7-7770HQ @2.8GHz,
32GB RAM, Windows 10) and the testbed environment is
re-initialized between scenario runs.
Unless otherwise noted, the OpenSAND network is con-
figured to use the DVB-S2 protocol with GSE encapsulation
for forward-link communications and DVB-RCS2 with RLE
encapsulation for the return link. The clear-sky SNR is set to
20 dB and Adaptive Coding and Modulation (ACM) is used
at the physical layer to provide quasi error free (QEF) commu-
nications at this SNR level. A constant speed-of-light delay
of 125 ms is used from both the satellite terminal and the
satellite gateway to the satellite (resulting in a 500 ms RTT).
The forward-link carrier frequency is allocated 50.0 MHz of
bandwidth with a roll-off factor of 0.25 and the return-link is
allocated approximately 7.4 MHz of bandwidth.
Simulations of QPEP are configured with a QPEP server
sitting local to the satellite gateway network and listening
for incoming QUIC tunnel connections. The QPEP client is
hosted on the satellite terminal and listens transparently into
all incoming TCP connections. The QPEP server is config-
ured to accept up to 40,000 concurrent streams from a single
host - substantially higher than the go-quic library’s default
setting of 100. This is to enable compatibility with concurrent
benchmarking downloads.
OpenVPN simulations are deployed similarly to QPEP,
with an OpenVPN client connected to the satellite terminal
and an OpenVPN server connected to the satellite gateway.
PEPsal is evaluated under two different configurations - a
distributed installation and an integrated installation. Evalu-
ations of distributed PEPsal are implemented with a PEPsal
endpoint transparently listening to all incoming TCP traffic
on both the satellite gateway and the satellite terminal. In
integrated PEPsal, a PEPsal endpoint listens to incoming TCP
traffic on the satellite terminal but no endpoint is installed on
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Figure 5: Goodput Comparison by Iperf Transfer Size
the satellite gateway. The effect of integrated PEPsal could
thus be realized without ISP participation while the distributed
installation would require explicit ISP support.
5.1 Basic Performance Evaluations
An initial comparative assessment of goodput can be made
through the use of the Iperf benchmarking tool which attempts
to provide consistent performance evaluations of network
speed. For these benchmarks, an Iperf server is hosted on
the satellite gateway network and is used to transfer data to
an Iperf client connected to the satellite terminal network.
Several iterations of Iperf are run, with data transfer sizes
ranging from 0.5 to 10 mb. Varying the volume of data trans-
ferred provides important insights into the extent to which
results are influenced by session initialization time or TCP
slow-start dynamics that exert heavy influence on small file
sizes but which matter less as size increases. The results of
these simulations are summarized in Figure 5.
These results suggest that QPEP is capable of making sig-
nificantly greater use of bandwidth for moderately-sized file
downloads under the Iperf benchmark than any of the tested
alternatives. To some extent, this is expected as Iperf gener-
ates many concurrent TCP connections as part of its test. As
QPEP takes advantage of QUIC’s internal support for multi-
plexing to bundle these concurrent TCP streams into a single
QUIC session, it is unsurprising that measured goodput is sig-
nificantly higher than in approaches which lack multiplexing.
Additionally, as QUIC supports sending data along with the
session initialization information in the first packets, QPEP
performs well for the transfer of very small files which can
be completed often in the first round-trip.
Integrated PEPsal does not offer significant advantage in
this use-case as it is still constrained by head-of-line blocking
over the satellite hop and a large portion of traffic is on the
un-optimized route from the gateway to the user terminal. Dis-
tributed PEPsal performs better as it is able to optimize both
directions of the satellite conversation. However, it also does
not match QPEP’s ability to encapsulate concurrent down-
loads. Finally, as expected, OpenVPN is the worst performing
of all options with no particular optimizations for the satellite
link and additional overhead from the VPN layer making it
perform slightly worse than a plain satellite connection.
This benchmark, while meaningful, is somewhat mislead-
ing. Iperf provides one important measure of goodput but
the scenario it evaluates is not representative of real-world
satellite internet user behavior. Specifically, opening a con-
nection to a port, ramping it up to maximum speed, and then
maintaining that speed for many file transfers is not how most
web services operate. Very few individuals are, for example,
streaming video or downloading large amounts of data over
expensive and low-bandwidth satellite links. PEPs were in-
vented to optimize web-browsing and visits to mostly text and
image-based online services. Even if QPEP were a useful tool
for encrypting large file transfers over satellite, its adoptability
in practice hinges on the ability to match existing PEPs for
typical use cases.
Figure 6: ECDF Comparison of PLTs over Alexa Top 20
A more realistic sense of this ability can be found through
the evaluation of the time it takes to visit real-world websites.
Unlike the IPerf benchmark, web-browsing consists of the
transfer of many small files (e.g. embedded images or style-
sheets) over multiple TCP sessions. Often, these files can be
hosted on a variety of servers. This makes web traffic more
sensitive to satellite latency effects than simple file transfer
traffic.
Experimentally measuring page load times is an impre-
cise art. For our simulations, we used the open-source web
benchmarking tool Browsertime [33]. Browsertime reports
page load time as the number of elapsed miliseconds from the
initial web browser request to the navigationStart event of the
browser’s underlying navigation timing API [25]. In our sim-
ulations, the satellite gateway was connected to a terrestrial
broadband network so as to connect to real-world websites.
This creates some variability between measurement runs as
9
they depend heavily on network conditions at measurement
time. To reduce this variability, measurements were made of
connections to the top 20 distinct domains listed by Alexa In-
ternet Inc [2]. Between each website visit, the browser cache
was reset. The results of these page load time measurements
are summarized by means of an Empirical Cumulative Distri-
bution Function (ECDF) in Figure 6.
This page load time comparison shows that QPEP provides
encrypted TCP sessions under real-world use-scenarios with-
out harming performance. While QPEP’s advantage here is
less dramatic than in the IPerf benchmark, it still outperforms
the unencrypted PEPsal proxy. QPEP’s mean page load time
(PLT) of 19.9 seconds is roughly 30% faster than distributed
PEPsal’s 27.8 seconds and almost 45% faster than integrated
PEPsal’s 35.9 second mean PLT.
The disadvantage of using traditional VPN technology to
encrypt satellite communications is quite clear as well. Open-
VPN takes, on average, almost thrice as long to load web
pages compared to QPEP, with a mean PLT of 56.4 seconds.
This suggests that QPEP meets its primary purpose of provid-
ing an encrypted over-the-air alternative to traditional VPNs
without incurring the same magnitude of performance loss.
QPEP is significantly more performant in this benchmark
than even unencrypted PEPs while offering higher degree of
security and not requiring installation of any software on the
ISP gateway itself.
5.2 Satellite Network Variations
While these basic evaluations present a compelling case for
the use of the QPEP approach to provide communications
security in typical GEO networks, many satellite networks
demonstrate atypical characteristics. Packet loss, rain-fade,
and variable routing delays can all have significant impacts
on satellite network performance. As such, we have elected
to evaluate the relative performance of QPEP under some of
these conditions.
Intuitively, packet loss and rain fade conditions are likely
significant challenges for the performance of tunneling PEPs
like QPEP. Loss of critical packets related to they key ex-
change process or initialization of QUIC sessions could im-
pose significant additional round-trip costs not observed in our
clear-sky condition tests. Tunneling PEPs are also vulnerable
to high-levels of packet loss which, depending on implemen-
tation, can cause the tunnel between the PEP client and server
to timeout or otherwise break altogether. However, the use of
a PEP can also improve network performance under loss con-
ditions as it mitigates the impact of TCP congestion-control
restarts as discussed in Section 2.2.
Given these concerns, a series of simulations were run to
assess QPEP’s performance characteristics at low Signal to
Noise Ratios (SNR). For these simulations, SNR was calcu-
lated by OpenSAND as a function of “attenuation” - a single
value representing losses from various physical sources. The
sum of attenuation values across each hop of the satellite
link was subtracted from a “clear-sky” SNR (set at 20 dB).
SNR values were tested at intervals of 0.5 dB, with 0.25 dB
attenuation on the forward link to the satellite terminal and
0.25 dB attenuation on the forward link to the satellite ground
station. To replicate real-world conditions, ACM was used at
the physical layer to optimize modulation and coding settings
(MODCOD) and reduce transmission errors. The MODCODs
employed were derived from those used in standard DVB-
S2/DVB-RCS2 implementations. SNRs from 20 dB (clear-
sky) to 10 dB were measured. Lower ratios were not evaluated
as ACM’s ability to provide QEF diminished causing a large
proportion of routing failures regardless of protocol and in-
creasing simulation time significantly (due to IPerf’s long
timeouts).
At each SNR interval, performance was measured over five
IPerf benchmarks with a file download size of 10 kb. Best
fit linear regressions for the results of these approximately
400 simulation runs are presented in Figure 7 with shaded
boundaries representing a 95% confidence interval.
Figure 7: IPerf Performance at Sub-Optimal SNR
As expected, we find that QPEP performance suffers at
diminishing SNR levels - albeit with increasing variability
at very low SNRs. This makes sense as sessions which are
“lucky” in the noisy environment and initialize without the
loss of key handshake packets perform in-line with clear-sky
rates while sessions which fail to do so face substantial RTT
penalties. QPEP outperforms distributed PEPsal at all SNR
levels but the inconsistency of its performance may make
QPEP less suitable for situations where reliable bandwidth
characteristics in the presence of noise are expected. Gener-
ally, the Iperf benchmark suggests that QPEP’s performance
exceeds that of an unencrypted satellite connection, even at
moderately low SNRs. At high levels of packet loss, however,
this performance advantage diminishes significantly. While
distributed PEPsal only failed to complete four IPerf sessions
(one at 11 dB and three at 10.5 dB), QPEP dropped a total
of seven (two at 10.5 dB and all five at 10 dB). The plain
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Figure 8: Average PLT of Amazon.com at Sub-Optimal SNR
un-optimized connection dropped no sessions.
Of course, while IPerf is a reasonable benchmark for file-
transfer times, web-browsing performance is much more heav-
ily influenced by the behavior of short small-data connections.
These connections are likely more resilient to the effects of
packet loss than the long-lived Iperf benchmark scenario. To
assess the impact of attenuation on page load times, a series of
simulations were run measuring the average page load time of
the Amazon.com homepage over five visits at each SNR level
(Figure 8). Amazon.com was selected as it is an e-commerce
site with many embedded product images, resulting in numer-
ous small and concurrent TCP-sessions of the sort PEPs are
intended to optimize and is also one of the most performant
sites we measured over an un-optimized satellite link in clear
sky conditions. We find that this performance edge is quickly
undermined in plain satellite networks as SNR (and TCP con-
gestion control restarts) both increase. However, both QPEP
and the distributed version of PEPsal maintain roughly equiv-
alent performance at moderate SNR levels. QPEP avoided
dropped connections until SNR fell below 14dB - outlast-
ing distributed PEPsal which began to experience reliability
issues at simulated SNRs of 17 and lower.
At very low SNR levels, however, distributed PEPsal does
appear to recover lost connections more reliably than QPEP.
This is likely a result of corrupted QUIC session initialization
packets (which are relatively large due to certificate data) pre-
venting the initialization of an encrypted tunnel. As with the
Iperf scenario, these results suggest that QPEP is suitable for
mild to moderate SNR attenuation but may struggle in par-
ticularly harsh communications environments. It is possible
a modified implementation of QPEP which uses preshared
keys to enable zero RTT session initialization may be prove
more resistant to this effect in future work.
While this paper has focused on GEO satellite networks
and performance under constant speed-of-light delays, many
modern satellite broadband proposals focus on the use of
LEO constellations which experience highly variable latency
Figure 9: ECDF of Alexa Top 20 PLTs in Iridium Simulation
depending on the location and time of transmission. To as-
sess performance under these conditions, we used an exist-
ing OpenSAND simulation model which replicates the delay
characteristics of a satellite terminal in the Atlantic Ocean
connecting through the Iridium LEO constellation to a gate-
way in London [5]. In the emulated LEO network, one-way
delay over the satellite hop varies from as low as 25 ms to
as high as 140 ms depending on the time of transmission
(and, by extension, the number of hops a signal must make
through the Iridium constellation). The same page load time
benchmark from section 5.1 was run within the LEO network
and the results are summarized in Figure 9.
As expected, the performance benefits of PEPs are less
dramatic in LEO satellite networks and the disadvantage of
VPN use significantly reduced. We find that QPEP still of-
fers the best performance across these tests with a mean PLT
of 14.4 seconds, besting OpenVPNs PLT of 16.4 seconds.
OpenVPN may implement optimizations for the moderate
levels of latency observed in this LEO scenario which lead to
this improved performance. Meanwhile, PEPsal was roughly
equivalent to an un-optimized connection with mean PLTs
of 19.4 seconds (integrated) and 23.1 seconds (distributed)
compared to a plain connection’s 21.2 second mean PLT. It is
possible that overhead incurred in PEPsal’s implementation
imposes performance costs in networks which lack substantial
latency delays. Taken together, these measurements suggest
that QPEP represents a viable mechanism for providing perfor-
mant encryption in modern LEO constellations and possibly
future mega-constellations. However, the performance gains
over traditional VPNs in LEO are only marginal.
5.3 QUIC Optimizations
One of the principal theoretical advantages of a distributed
PEP configuration is the ability to adopt non-standard and
environmentally tailored protocols over the satellite hop. In
this section, we consider what modifications to the standard
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QUIC implementation may be well suited to the satellite envi-
ronment and evaluate their impact on performance within our
testbed. This is a cursory look and we expect that future work
on optimizing the QUIC protocol for satellite - especially the
congestion control mechanism - may prove fruitful.
One strategy for improving the performance of TCP ACKs
over satellite links is ACK decimation - the process of com-
bining many ACK messages into a single message sent at
regular intervals. In the default QUIC implementation, ACK
decimation is set to result in a minimum of one ACK mes-
sage for every ten ACK-eliciting packets. However, as we
control both ends of the QUIC link in a QPEP installation, it
is possible to change this standard value on both the client
and server side of the connection to optimize link behavior.
By increasing number of elicitations per ACK, it may become
possible to diminish the effect that link asymmetry has on
the performance of the QPEP proxy. However, with greater
spacing between ACK messages, the risk of unnoticed packet
loss causing delay can increase.
These expectations are borne out by experimental simula-
tions with QPEP using five runs of the IPerf benchmarking
tool for a 10 mb file transfer at differing ACK decimation
ratios ranging from 1 elicitation per ACK to 200. For the
purpose of these simulations, ACK decimation began after
the 10th packet over the QUIC link (as opposed to the default
setting of 100 packets prior to ACK decimation) and timeout-
based ACK queuing was disabled. These changes were made
to better focus on the effect of ACK decimation in isolation
without the complexities of the full QUIC congestion con-
trol implementation. As a result, measurements from these
simulations are not directly comparable with those made in
other sections. The IPerf benchmark was selected rather than
PLT benchmarks as the longer-lived sessions would likely bet-
ter exhibit the influence of high ACK decimation ratios than
web-pages involving the transfer of relatively few packets.
The results of this simulation (see Figure 10) suggest that
greater ACK decimation ratios can result in increased good-
put. However, at very high levels of ACK decimation, this
relationship weakens as the risk of long-unnoticed packet
loss leads to performance degradation. While these simula-
tions were conducted under clear-sky dynamics, it is possible
that optimal decimation ratios would vary substantially under
adverse conditions. Future work geared towards analyzing
this relationship to find an ideal (or dynamic) ACK decima-
tion ratio would likely be productive - especially in a model
which considers QUIC’s other congestion control strategies.
Still, this initial assessment shows that QPEP architecture
permits bespoke QUIC optimizations not generally consid-
ered feasible in prior performance assessments of QUIC over
satellite links. Even if QUIC were not, by default, sufficiently
performant for satellite network encryption (e.g. in LEO con-
stellations), modifications of this nature represent a promising
mechanism for achieving further performance gains.
Another approach used in TCP PEPs is the adjustment
Figure 10: IPerf Goodput vs ACK Decimation Ratio
of the initial congestion window (CWND) to accelerate the
cumbersome TCP slow-start process. As QUIC implements a
similar startup mechanism, it is possible that increasing the
QUIC initial CWND size may have similar effects. In the
standard QUIC implementation used for our simulations, this
is set to the size of 10 QUIC packets. Several test visits to the
BBC Homepage were run over initial CWND sizes ranging
from 1 QUIC packet to 50. While polynomial regression
suggests that there may exist an optimal initial CWND of
around 25 QUIC packets, this association is not particularly
pronounced (Figure 11). At least for our PLT tests, QPEP
appears to reach appropriate CWND size relatively quickly,
regardless of initial starting condition.
Figure 11: Average PLT of BBC Homepage vs Initial CWND
size
These two demonstrative scenarios illustrate the case that
modifications to the underlying QUIC protocol implementa-
tion used by QPEP may have a meaningful impact on proxy
performance. There are dozens of constants and assumptions
made in common QUIC protocol implementations and these
are not necessarily tailored towards the unique network en-
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vironment of satellite communications. Finding the perfect
balance of QUIC parameters for satellite networking is well
beyond the scope of this research and represents a signifi-
cant but non-insurmountable engineering challenge. However,
QPEP is already dramatically more performant than tradi-
tional VPN security over satellite and either equivalent to or
better than unencrypted PEPs in our benchmarks. Thus, this
optimization challenge, while interesting, is largely irrelevant
to the overall suggestion that QUIC can contribute towards
a secure and sufficiently performant TCP-PEP for modern
satellite broadband.
6 Future Work
It is worth noting that the QPEP implementation presented
here is very much a demonstrative proof-of-concept. Future
work, either for academic purposes or for real-world com-
mercial use would likely benefit from implementing several
additional features. First, the networking protocols supported
by QPEP are limited only to TCP over IPv4. Adding IPv6
support and support for tunneling non-TCP protocols (such
as UDP) would be useful. It is unlikely that QPEP would
significantly improve performance of protocols like UDP (as
UDP performance is not as latency sensitive), but encrypting
DNS requests and other information sent over UDP data-
grams would be key to realizing the full security and privacy
benefits of encrypted over-the-air SATCOMs. Additionally,
further support for atypical TCP-header parameters and better
handling of TCP error states in the case of packet loss may
improve real-world customer experience.
Beyond these largely engineering-related areas for further
development, several academic questions may be worth closer
consideration. As we have briefly discussed in section 5.3,
the QPEP architecture obviates many of the concerns raised
in prior work regarding the suitability of QUIC to satellite en-
vironments by allowing for end-to-end optimization of QUIC
protocol parameters. Many more advanced features of QUIC
- such as use of 0-RTT session initialization or proposed FEC
standards - were beyond the scope of this preliminary re-
search. However, the testbed presented here may prove useful
for assessing the implications of such changes under various
satellite networking conditions. While our testbed was de-
signed for the development of a more secure PEP platform, it
may be well suited to the general problem of understanding
and optimizing the interaction between QUIC and satellite
networks.
7 Conclusion
In this research, we have challenged the historical assumption
that security and performance must trade off in high-latency
satellite networks. We have presented a new approach to en-
crypting TCP satellite communications over-the-air through
the use of QPEP - a performance enhancing proxy which
leverages the open QUIC protocol standard to provide an
encrypted UDP tunnel for the satellite hop. By making mi-
nor bespoke modifications to the QUIC protocol, we have
demonstrated that QUIC may be further optimized for the
particularities of the satellite environment - obviating many
of the performance concerns raised by prior work.
To evaluate QPEP, we have developed an experimental
benchmarking suite built on the OpenSAND satellite simu-
lation engine. This open-source research testbed facilitates
replicable and meaningful comparison of TCP PEP perfor-
mance over satellite networks. Our evaluations demonstrate
that the QPEP approach offers comparable performance to
unencrypted PEPs and dramatically outperforms VPN-based
encryption to provide secure TCP communications over satel-
lite links.
To our knowledge, QPEP is the first open source PEP
proof-of-concept with support for the encryption of arbitrary
TCP traffic. Moreover, unlike many commercial secure PEPs,
QPEP operation is fully independent to the satellite ISP, al-
lowing individual satellite customers to run their own QPEP
servers in the cloud and adopt the protocol without substantial
changes to ISP infrastructure or the sharing of sensitive traffic
metadata with the ISP. While QPEP is a rudimentary proof
of concept and further development work would be required
for reliability in critical commercial networks, these prelimi-
nary results suggest that the QUIC-tunneling PEP approach
is a promising and straightforward alternative to proprietary
satellite encryption standards.
As the next generation of satellite broadband projects be-
gins to launch, there remains a critical need for ensuring the
security and privacy of TCP communications in these net-
works without sacrificing performance. The QPEP proof-of-
concept presented here demonstrates the ability of extend-
ing open and verifiable standards to meet this need. Beyond
QPEP, the benchmarking and testbed approach demonstrated
in our research makes a methodological contribution, hope-
fully paving the way for future replicable research towards
the development of secure modern satellite broadband.
Availability
Source code and documentation for both our QPEP imple-
mentation and our OpenSAND-based testbed environment are
available publicly (https://github.com/pavja2/qpep). Exam-
ple python scripts used to run all of the simulation scenarios
presented in this paper are provided.
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